INTRODUCTION
I am tempted indeed to declare dogmatically that whatever doctrine the Armed Forces are working on now, they have got it wrong. I am also tempted to declare that it does not matter that they have got it wrong. What does matter is their capacity to get it right quickly when the moment arrives…Still it is the task of military science in an age of peace to prevent the doctrines from being too badly wrong.
Michael Howard, Military Science in an Age of Peace
In contemplating any endeavor, planning is perhaps the most difficult human activity.
Plotting a course to the future is even more problematic when that future is uncertain and the implications of today's decisions endure for years. For the military, planning is particularly consequential. In business, a bad decision may lead to a poor quarterly result, at the very worst, bankruptcy. By contrast, poor military planning may result not in the loss of a company, but the country. Choices of force structure arguably cast the longest shadow of any military decision.
The US Army is embarking on a path of transformation to a future force. Progress toward improved capabilities is essential, but many have argued the first step in this transformation is a doozy. 1 Therefore, it seems important to examine the underpinnings of the operational concept that forms the foundation for this force. At the heart of transformation is the desire to increase strategic mobility without sacrificing combat power. The desired deployment timeline for the lead unit of the transformation, the interim brigade combat team (IBCT), requires airlift. This fact logically leads to the question: "Can the airlift system deploy the IBCT in the timeline required by the operational concept?"
The scope of this monograph is restricted to airlift feasibility. Two important areas of contention are excluded from the analysis presented herein. There are numerous methods of projecting power in the interest of national security and numerous forces that can be used. At the Defense Department level there is an ongoing discussion of roles and missions, which bears on the question of which is the best force (or combination) to serve this purpose. This question is outside the boundaries of this composition. Moreover, the transformation concept encompasses the full spectrum of considerations for design, deployment and employment of ground forces.
Issues range from fire support to combined arms at the company level to dependence on joint assets to overdependence on technology, etc. Description of the transformation vision lays a foundation for understanding the importance of the research question, but the analysis presented here excludes the multitude of substantive considerations that address the employment effectiveness of different configurations of Army forces. These two areas of study are left to other concerned members of the defense community.
The analysis is structured in five sections. The first section characterizes the security climate that provided impetus for transformation. The 1990s saw the collapse of the Soviet Union, conclusion of the Persian Gulf War, and demands for decreased defense spending. In response, the national security strategy shifted significantly and overseas forces were brought home. This dramatic series of events coupled with an increasingly complex and unpredictable international security environment provided the catalyst for transformation.
Section two outlines the vision for transformation. Throughout recent history, Army force structure has struggled with heavy forces that are too heavy to arrive in time and light forces that are too light to affect the battle. To remedy this shortfall in response to the present security environment, the Army Chief of Staff proposed a bold vision of a medium weight option, enabled by technology and innovative doctrine. This new force aspires to full-spectrum dominance through improved strategic mobility without sacrificing lethality or survivability. The basic building block of the transformed Army is the IBCT, the first of which becomes fully operational in 2007.
Airlift has its own vision of the future with dramatic materiel advances. But the siren song of quantum leap technology may leave us with a capability gap between the force projection strategy selected and the ability to carry it out. The lift system used as the baseline for analyzing the IBCT must be a system that will be available in 2007 to meet the first IBCT off the assembly line. In 2007, the strategic airlift system will not be significantly changed from the present fleet.
While there are promising futuristic concepts for dramatically increased global lift, the timeline for acquiring these capabilities exceeds the time available prior to IBCT rollout. Section three depicts the airlift fleet of 2007, along with the air mobility support system necessary to facilitate any strategic air deployment. Planning for future force projection must be based on these airlift realities.
The quantitative analysis of the paper seeks to combine the lift requirements of the IBCT with the lift capabilities of the programmed airlift system in a deployment scenario. Computer programs are perfectly suited for simulating and analyzing such a deployment flow. Section four describes the Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation (JFAST) and presents the output results of several deployment parameter sets. It is this section that directly answers the research question. Conclusions are stated in the final section. They flow logically from the quantitative analysis, building on the foundational understanding of the airlift system, the transformation vision and the modern security environment.
Security Environment: the Impetus for Transformation

" The future ain't what it used to be " Yogi Berra 2
Though frequently charged (most often by its members) with changing simply for the sake of change, the military actually endeavors to anchor its planning in an analysis of the threat facing the nation. The decade of the 1990s witnessed tectonic changes in the security environment that were unforeseen even just a few years earlier.
Death of the Cold War and Loss of a Best, Worst Enemy
On November 9, 1989, officials of the German Democratic Republic opened the wall 247,000 in 1999. 16 In other words, the majority of the drawdown was accomplished by cutting forward-based forces.
Post Cold War Realities
Unfortunately, the scarcity of forward positioned personnel did nothing to curb the appetite for them. Coincident with the drawdown was a shift in national strategy from global This equation is complicated for the Army by the reality that while it can directly affect its tailoring of forces, the lift capacity to project those forces is provided by other services. Thus, structuring units, materiel and doctrine to enhance strategic mobility is an essential consideration for Army force development. 22 The 1995 National Military Strategy provides a clear discussion of the two complementary strategic concepts of overseas presence and power projection. 23 Power projection is practiced by all the services. The Air Force conducts global air strikes within hours of alert, launched from CONUS bases; Marine Amphibious Ready Groups stand poised forward to intervene within hours or days of alert (depending on location); and Navy carrier battle groups provide the most continually visible element of US forward presence. Again, the scope of this paper is limited to the Army's contribution to power projection, and more specifically to the airlift feasibility of the IBCT. were essentially exercises in power projection. 26 The task of moving forces in that age was relatively uncomplicated since armies were essentially groups of armed men.
The Transformation Concept
27
The industrialization and mechanization of warfare complicated the task of power projection by creating forces that were significantly more lethal and survivable, but by the same token, less strategically responsive. In simple terms, they were just too heavy and bulky to move easily from theater to theater. Not only were the forces themselves prohibitively large, they also 27 In reality, even ancient armies were composed of more than just armed men. They too, required a support structure of some sort, many employed horses and there were other considerations that complicated force projection, especially in the context of their mobility capabilities. Nonetheless, in contrast to a fully mechanized force, the armies of antiquity were relatively uncomplicated. Obviously, light forces would have deployed much more quickly in each of these scenarios (in fact they were part of the Gulf War team), however they would not have had the firepower, protection or tactical mobility to survive and execute the mission on their own. World
War II is replete with examples of light Italian, British, American and German units who were overrun or bypassed by armored and mechanized forces. 33 Clearly, the missing piece of the puzzle is an elusive amalgam of both ends of the spectrum: a medium weight force with responsive strategic mobility but packing enough firepower and survivability to hold its own once committed. This is what the Army's current transformation is all about.
The Chief's Vision
In October 1999, new Army Chief of Staff (CSA), General Eric Shinseki, presented a bold vision of a transformed Army. He described an objective force that transcends the light/heavy paradigm of the current force structure to become more strategically agile, gain a credible early-entry capability and maintain the lethality and survivability of the current heavy units to achieve full-spectrum dominance. This new Army would be able to put a brigade-size combat force anywhere in the world by airlift 96 hours after liftoff, a division on the ground in 120 hours and five divisions in 30 days. with specific aims for doctrine, organization and technology.
In the expedition toward the Objective Force, Army Transformation balances three competing imperatives. It must invest in the research and development to produce technology enablers for the future. At the same time, it must maintain a credible and ready force for deterrence and warfighting. Finally, it endeavors to field quickly a medium-weight, early-entry force for the near-term. This three-pronged approach is presented graphically in Figure 1 .
Figure 1 Army Transformation 35
The top arrow portrays the legacy forces that will maintain the Army's high-end warfighting capability during the transformation. precision munitions, wide-area surveillance, manned and unmanned delivery platforms, lowobservability, fuel cells, directed energy weapons, robotics and ceramic armor. 39 As these innovations materialize, they will be matched with the maturing doctrine of the objective force to enable full implementation of the transformation vision.
Clearly, this process will be iterative with feedback loops to allow doctrine to maintain influence on the research and development and to keep doctrine grounded in the realm of the possible. The third arrow in the transformation graphic represents the vehicle for that feedback.
IBCT
At the heart of the transformation lies the IBCT. It is the basic unit of Army combat power and the building block for the objective force. This organization serves two purposes: it fills the gap between heavy and light forces to provide an interim early-entry capability for national decision makers; and provides a working laboratory to refine the doctrinal and organizational concepts that will mature into the objective force. Ibid, 21 and Hunter, et al, 11. In order to fulfill both roles, the first IBCT had to begin the transition as soon as possible. IBCTs to be fielded on the way to the objective force.
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The IBCT is organized around three motorized, infantry battalions with combined arms implemented at the company level. A reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA) squadron and military intelligence company support the situational understanding necessary to develop a situation out of contact. An antitank company adds a standoff weapon capability to increase flexibility and survivability. The field artillery battalion's vital mission is proactive counterbattery fire to reduce casualties of the highly vulnerable infantry battalions. The brigade also contains an engineer company, signal company, and a brigade support battalion. Other traditional support capabilities would be part of a supporting divisional structure or taskorganized into the unit for a specific mission profile.
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Although the essence of the IBCT is its doctrine and organization, the choice of vehicles is certainly a non-trivial issue. The interim armored vehicle (IAV) will be chosen from off-theshelf options and modified into several variants to serve the needs of the brigade. This concept will not only speed fielding, but will simplify the logistical support for the unit. The variants will include an infantry carrier vehicle (ICV), mobile gun system and howitzer and several configurations of the ICV to support other battlefield functions. 44 In order to enhance theater mobility, all IBCT equipment (to include the IAV) will be C-130 transportable.
Army Transformation aims to remedy the gap between lethal, survivable heavy forces and rapidly deployable light forces to give the national command authority an early entry, fullspectrum force option. The ultimate solution is the objective force, enabled by science and technology advancements produced over the next 10-20 years. In the meantime, the IBCT will exploit off-the-shelf technology and an innovative operational concept to provide an interim, medium weight alternative. This transformation effort attempts to addresses the tailored forces component of force projection. The next step is to examine the airlift system on which it depends for global mobility. Tailoring forces (along with their doctrine, organization and equipment) for an earlyentry, robust-employment concept addresses only one of the elements in the force projection equation. The other element is the airlift system required to transport forces into theater.
Obviously, the most visible component of the airlift system is the aircraft fleet.
Airlifters: The Future
The Army's objective force is a vision for the future. The forces do not exist now; technology has not even been developed to make them possible. Conventional wisdom then requires that the planning scenario for deployment of this future force must also consider the airlift fleet projected forward in time. Exciting technologies for airlift aircraft advancements are currently in the concept development phase.
One of these advanced concepts outlines the vision for a trans-atmospheric vehicle (TAV) . 45 This version of the airlifter of the future would launch in rocket-like fashion, exit the atmosphere and reenter according to the desired landing location and descent profile. The TAV design achieves the primary benefit of reducing en route time to one hour or less for any destination on the globe. 
Airlifters: The Relevant Future
Since 
C-5B Galaxy 55
The C-5 is the largest aircraft in the world. Its specialty is inter-theater airlift of outsized 56 cargo. Although it can takeoff and land on relatively short airfields, loading, servicing and payload requirements dictate that it operate primarily to and from large conventional airports. Typically, this equipment is limited to the C-5 and C-17 aircraft which were specifically designed to accommodate these cargo types. An example of an outsize piece of cargo, which is also roll-on/roll-off, is an M1A1 Abrams Tank."
Crews can load and unload simultaneously from the front and rear when the nose section is rotated vertically to allow front access to the cargo compartment. The Galaxy is capable of uploading 102 tons, flying a distance of 2150 nautical miles, offloading, and returning to a landing point within 500 miles of its original departure airport without air refueling. With aerial refueling that distance can be extended to the limits of crew endurance.
While it is uniquely capable for the mission for which it was designed, the C-5 is an old airframe. The first aircraft was delivered in June 1970 and the last in March of 1989.
Consequently, it is struggling with declining maintainability, reliability and supportability, while operating costs escalate. Its mission capable (MC) rate (percentage of aircraft able to fly at any given time) is currently in the low 60 percent range, as compared to a programmed MC rate of 75 percent. 57 To remedy the situation and extend the service life of the aircraft, Air Mobility
Command (AMC) is planning a phased modernization plan that will include engine turbine replacement, avionics modernization, re-engining and reliability improvement. 58 Regrettably, the modifications will not be completed until 2011. 59 The C-5 is augmented by the C-17
Globemaster III.
C-17 Globemaster III 60
The C-17 is the newest addition to the airlift fleet. deliver cargo to its final destination without cross-loading at a main theater operating baseenhances the deployment effectiveness and efficiency of this aircraft. The C-17 can upload 80 tons of cargo and travel 2400 nautical miles unrefueled. Like the C-5, it is air refuelable, extending the practical range to the limit of aircrew endurance. Strategic lift is only part of its repertoire, as the C-17 is also airdrop capable, delivering both equipment and up to 102
paratroopers.
The retirement of C-141s and replacement by fewer C-17s will result in a net loss of 131 aircraft tail numbers. The completed C-17 fleet will have a greater overall strategic airlift capacity than the current C-141 fleet, due partly to a greater aircraft capacity and higher crew ratio.
However, concentrating the same (or greater airlift) into fewer discrete packages reduces the number of locations that can be served by airlift during any given time period. The result is a significant loss in flexibility due to the simple fact that unlike the three C-141s they replaced, two C-17s cannot be in three places at once. Moreover, each C-17 down for maintenance equates to a larger percentage of the overall lift capability. Although the C-17 is capable of direct delivery it is augmented in the intra-theater lift role by the C-130 Hercules.
C-130 Hercules 62
The venerable C-130 Hercules, or "Herk," is the workhorse performing the bulk of the intratheater portion of the airlift mission. It specializes in combat aerial delivery and airland missions to rough dirt strips. After four decades of continuous production, the Herk fleet is composed of numerous different models with different technical data and operating characteristics. In 1998, an AMC "Tiger Team" of experts was commissioned to identify problems with the system and develop an integrated, long-term plan to solve them. 64 The result was an overall strategy to replace the oldest C-130Es with new C-130Js and modify the remaining models to a common C-130 X configuration. 65 This blueprint will simplify the maintenance and reduce logistic requirements for sustaining the C-130 fleet.
One of the explicit requirements of the IBCT is that all equipment must be C-130 transportable. 66 This condition enhances operational mobility by enabling the IBCT to move within the theater of operations on CINC-owned aircraft to destinations that may be served only by unimproved airfields. Unfortunately, the Herk is as unsuited for inter-theater mobility missions as it is perfectly designed for theater airlift operations. Its lack of range and small payload remove it completely from the picture for deployment between theaters. The Herk, like all airlifters, is dependent on the Global Air Mobility Support System for sustainment and support.
The Enabler: Global Air Mobility Support System (GAMSS)
No matter how capable the fleet is, aircraft do not just take off from a departure base and land at their destination. There is a lot more to the picture than the actual flight activities; just as with any military operation, there is a robust support mechanism required to generate and sustain movement. For airlift, this mechanism is the Global Air Mobility Support System (GAMSS).
GAMSS is an integrated system, stretching from CONUS aerial ports of embarkation (APOEs) to aerial ports of debarkation (APODs), that facilitates the movement of combat and support forces.
The GAMSS is not a fixed structure or a standard template. It is comprised of permanent support locations throughout the world and support units capable of rapid deployment to augment the 64 AMC Strategic Plan 2000. 65 Ibid. infrastructure and personnel at permanent locations, or to create support facilities in locations where none exist. 67 In the simplest scenario, a strategic deployment would fall within the capabilities of permanent overseas support locations. Minimal augmentation would be required to support the throughput of strategic airlift. The parent organization providing en route support at permanent bases is the Air Mobility Support Group (AMSG). As the largest command element, the AMSG plans, establishes procedures and orchestrates the activities of subordinate units to ensure air mobility operations are properly supported within its area of responsibility (AOR). 68 The Air
Mobility Support Squadron (AMSS) is the subordinate unit directly responsible for providing services to transiting AMC forces. Each AMSS operates an air mobility control center (AMCC)
to provide command and control of global air mobility forces in direct coordination with AMC's Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC). 69 The AMSS's air terminal operations center (ATOC) directs port activities, including passenger and cargo onload/offload and servicing of aircraft, either with organic assets or through contract relationships with host nation or other vendors.
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The final major element of the AMSS is the maintenance support flight, which is configured to provide maintenance functions (including some system repair) to certain aircraft, depending on which weapon systems commonly transit that location.
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Regrettably, the airlift en route infrastructure suffered from the same drawdown that affected the rest of the military machine. In 1990, AMC operated a worldwide en route system boasting 45 permanent overseas locations supported by nearly 5,500 personnel. Over the last decade, the number was slashed to 12 locations and less than 4,000 people while optempo increased for the same period. 
Methodology
Having described the two elements of force projection, tailored forces and lift capability, all that remains is to combine them in a meaningful way to answer the question, " can the Air
Force lift the IBCT in 96 hours." The most reliable method would be to marshal the unit with all its associated equipment, activate the defense transportation system and execute a strategic movement to another theater. This, of course, is infeasible given the cost, effort, and the fact that most of the equipment does not yet exist. 80 Fortunately, an air movement is something that is easily modeled, depending on the level of fidelity required. Given an appropriate scenario with associated facts, assumptions and allocated airlift assets, there are a number of computer programs available to provide an analyst the means to evaluate the deployability of a unit. The tool used by the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is known as JFAST, the Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation.
The Tool: Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation (JFAST)
JFAST is the application of JOPES automated data processing suite specifically designed to simulate strategic or operational movements. Operations planners use this tool to generate detailed estimates of transportation resource requirements. 81 It is also useful in estimating the impact of varying lift resource allocation and support system characteristics on closure of a specific movement plan. JFAST provides detailed information about every aspect of the movement, including: closure estimates, congestion points, optimum transportation mode, 80 In fact, the analysis should be accomplished before the units have been fielded in order to validate the operational concept. attrition effects, lift utilization, gross lift capability and shortfalls. 82 The tool presents this information in a variety of reports, charts and graphs that are extremely flexible. It is also the US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) standard for evaluating the transportation feasibility of all OPLAN/CONPLAN Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD).
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In order to evaluate a proposed movement, the JFAST operator requires three primary elements of information. First, the user must develop a TPFDD, which describes the elements of the unit(s) to be deployed and their movement priority. Next, the deployment will have an allocation of lift resources either from the governing documents, higher headquarters orders or set by the user to evaluate different scenarios for iterative refinement of a plan. Finally, the operator must have a concept of operations detailing how the user wants to conduct the movement, to include constraints on the transportation system (e.g. must operate daytime only at certain airports, cannot overfly specific countries, etc.). With this information, the JFAST operator can simulate a variety of movements to give the planner an understanding of the feasibility and characteristics of the movement he is proposing.
IBCT Deployment Scenario
For analysis of deployments and deployment processes, the Army relies on the 
Aircraft Allocation
Allocating aircraft for a notional contingency detached from an international and domestic context is not as simple as it may sound. Airlift aircraft perform a peacetime function beyond just training for conflict. The peacetime military has a continuous requirement for movement, from PCS shipments to aircraft parts to carrier battle group personnel. Even absent a competing national emergency, a small-scale contingency (SSC) will be competing for available strategic airlift capacity with sustainment lift requirements in other theaters. This reality and a host of other intervening variables force an element of subjectivity into the allocation of aircraft for analysis. Plan (JSCP) for similar situations, and the judgment of subject matter experts. 90 It also included some assumptions: two to three days warning time for movement, a presidential selective reserve callup, no competing national emergency and programmed MC rates for C-5s and C-17s. 91 This script yielded 26 C-5s and 30 C-17s at day four of the contingency, ramping up to 48 C-5s and 51
C-17s by day 14. Since the IBCT 96-hour requirement is measured from first takeoff, not when the order is issued, the lead time was excluded from the analysis timeline. Consequently, FPBLSE used 26 C-5s and 30 C-17s on day one with a steady ramp-up to the final numbers on day 13. With aircraft allocated, the next step in the modeling effort is to define the concept of operations that governs the way the aircraft are used.
Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for Deployment
Clearly, the most fundamental element of the CONOPS is the deployment location.
Many of the constraints affecting aircraft movement will be determined by the real world characteristics of the location. Training and Doctrine Command Analysis Center, Fort
Leavenworth (TRAC-LVN), under direction from the deputy chief of staff for combat development, selected the Balkans, specifically Kosovo, as the proving ground for the IBCT.
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This scenario is a logical choice for a number of reasons: it is the location of historic conflict with the promise of continuing unrest; the US military has recent experience there, including the deployment of Task Force Hawk for comparison; and it presents a deployment with limited ports and infrastructure. Additionally, the region contains complex terrain and a primitive road/rail network to challenge tactical mobility and employment, thereby providing the opportunity to evaluate equally difficult deployment and employment circumstances with the same scenario.
Since the first IBCT resides at Fort Lewis, Washington, the concept requires the IBCT to deploy Another aspect of the CONOPS is the choice to use en route fueling bases or aerial refueling or a combination of the two. When MOG at the destination is unrestricted, aerial refueling speeds up the flow by reducing the time required for each aircraft to make a round trip and pick up its next load. However, a movement plan dependent on aerial refueling is complicated by competition for another limited resource, tanker aircraft. These assets are particularly scarce during a large-scale military action, since they are required for the deployment of Air Force, Navy and Marine combat aircraft. In the Kosovo scenario, the restricted MOG deletes any benefit that would be gained by aerial refueling; even if the aircraft were aerial refueled to reduce their cycle time, they wouldn't have a spot on the destination airfield.
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Consequently, the CONOPS used an en route refueling base to support the deployment. This choice carries with it the requirement for air mobility support personnel and equipment to operate the en route location as an additional footing in the air bridge. 
Results
FPBLSE JFAST analysis began with the baseline scenario and used the varying airlift allocations described above to investigate the impact on closure time for the IBCT TPFDD.
USTRANSCOM Recommended SSC Allocation
The first (and arguably most appropriate) analysis used the USTRANSCOM/AMC coordinated estimate of actual aircraft availability for the IBCT in an SSC mobilization in 2007.
This set of parameters included the real-world MOG estimate of six aircraft at APOE and APOD, and an aircraft allocation that began with 26 C-5s and 30 C-17s and ramped up to 48 C-5s and 51
C-17s on day 13. Under these constraints, the IBCT closed in 7.3 days or 175 hours-79 hours longer than the required 96-hour deadline. Maximum Number of C-17s with APOE/APOD MOG of 6
One other difference between the C-5 and C-17 is in passenger load characteristics. The C-5 has a dedicated passenger cabin above the cargo compartment. As a result, the C-5 can carry 36 passengers without sacrificing cargo capacity. The C-17, by contrast, has no dedicated passenger seats. Passenger seats will subtract from cargo capacity, depending on the specific configuration of the cargo compartment and actual dimensions of cargo. To accommodate the difference and keep the C-17 loaded with as much cargo as possible, the C-17 only scenario uses
Boeing 757 aircraft to move the majority of the passengers on the TPFDD. This combination used 94 C-17s and three 757s, closing in 5.0 days or 120 hours-24 hours longer than the required 96-hour timeline.
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Maximum Number of C-17s with APOE/APOD MOG of 7
The C-17 (with three 757s) closed the TPFDD faster than the other aircraft allocations.
Unfortunately, with the maximum number of aircraft allowed by the MOG, this allocation still failed to meet the requirement. The next logical alternative is to increase the MOG to allow more aircraft into the flow. In reality, increasing the MOG may not be feasible. There may not be another usable airfield in range and the construction required to increase the ramp space of the available airfields may be prohibitive in cost, time, manpower or equipment. Nevertheless, determining the effect of an increased MOG will provide information about the most restrictive conditions under which the IBCT could meet the deployment timeline. With the MOG increased to seven aircraft at both the departure and arrival airfields, the scenario supports 109 C-17s and closes in 4.4 days or 106 hours-10 hours longer than the required 96-hour timeline.
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Optimal Number of C-17s with APOE/APOD MOG of 8
Increasing the MOG at the departure and destination to eight aircraft supports the required timeline. Using 123 C-17s (augmented with three 757s for passengers), the IBCT TPFDD closes in exactly 96 hours. 103 Although significantly increasing the available aircraft and the airfield capacity eventually produced a set of parameters that would enable the IBCT to deploy in the allotted time, there are several other considerations that must be addressed.
Additional Considerations
The JFAST simulation adequately represents the behavior of a deployment, provided
there are no problems in the execution. JFAST assumes all aircraft take off when scheduled, fly in the allotted time and land when expected. It allows no room for maintenance attrition, or even maintenance delays. 104 The programmed MC rate for C-17s, as stated earlier, is 75 percent. That factor affects not only the airframes available at the beginning of the deployment, but also their behavior during its execution. The normal method employed to mitigate the effect of aircraft that break during the flow is to use spare aircraft to fill the holes. This is fine, provided there are aircraft available, and at the right place. If an aircraft were to break at an en route location and the only spare available was at McChord, that load would be setback by a number of hours waiting for the spare to arrive and get loaded. Even when a spare is available at the right location, the time required for trans-loading from the broken aircraft to the spare could amount to several hours. A slip of several hours can cause significant problems when an arrival base MOG is restricted. Besides maintenance difficulties, delays or diverts caused by adverse weather will also contribute to the friction of a deployment. These factors and a host of other potential complications reveal a JFAST deployment as an unachievable ideal that is useful for planning, but insufficient to describe the likely character of the execution. Like maintenance attrition, another difficulty encountered in the real world, but ignored by JFAST, is the movement requirement for support personnel and equipment.
The airlift system presented in the previous section is dependent on the global air mobility support system to effect strategic deployment. As described, the permanent facilities in place around the world are insufficient to support a major deployment. While AMC has the personnel, equipment and processes required to augment the en route system, this action takes time and its own dedicated airlift. The IBCT 96-hour clock begins ticking at takeoff of the first aircraft. To validate this start time there must be unambiguous warning and strategic lift necessary to deploy an appropriate global reach laydown package before deployment of the IBCT is required. Due to the absence of warning, indecision of senior decision-makers, or simply the vagaries of international diplomacy, the GAMSS may not be activated until the deployment of the IBCT is already desired. In this case, the GRL deployment flow would append to the front end of the IBCT TPFDD. A situation similar to the analysis CONOPS could demand as much as 785 personnel and 1,176 short tons of equipment. 105 This package equates to three 747s and 30 C-17 loads and would likely require most of a day to move (depending on the aircraft allocation immediately available in a situation without advanced warning). While the CSA's 96-hour constraint technically excludes actions necessary to activate an air bridge, reality may turn this into a case of false advertising when decision-makers are counting on a 96-hour response. The familiar military dictum, "In peace, prepare for war," is a compelling sentiment, but easier stated than accomplished. Before preparation can take place, the "war" to be prepared for must be defined, a task that is becoming increasingly difficult. Contemporary views of the nature of future conflict are shaped by the international and domestic events of the past decade.
Conclusions
The Cold War, for all its fear of global nuclear annihilation was a simple and familiar threat.
While the prospect of major theater war was terrifying, it provided a stable, predictable scenario upon which to base military force structure and planning. The fall of the Soviet Union brought relief from the specter of World War III and the arms race that had dominated defense spending for generations, but left in its wake an uncertain security environment. Nevertheless, in response to warming relations with the former Soviet Union and domestic appeals for a peace dividend, the US government slashed overseas force levels and the budgets that accompanied them.
As the US national security strategy shifted from global containment of communism to a policy of regional engagement, it soon became evident that conflict would become more the rule and less the exception. At the same time, globalization of economic interests and enlargement of alliances gave rise to a broadened defense sphere increasingly sensitive to any threat of instability. Intervening in this complicated world with CONUS-based forces presents a real challenge in force projection. Force projection can be viewed as the product of tailored forces and lift capacity.
Current Army forces come generally in two flavors. Light forces are strategically agile, but lack the combat punch and staying power needed to force a decision in battle. Heavy forces are unmatched in killing power and survivability but take months to deploy. General Shinseki's bold vision of transformation aims to remedy the situation. Enabled by science and technology solutions and guided by innovative doctrine, the objective force seeks to achieve full spectrum dominance by concentrating more power in a lighter, leaner package. The basic unit of this force is a brigade combat team capable of strategic deployment in 96 hours. The first of these units, the IBCT, is scheduled to become operational in 2007.
The national airlift system has futuristic concepts of its own. From trans-atmospheric transports to dirigible-type airships, research and development is alive and well in the business of intertheater lift. Unfortunately, seven years is not nearly enough time to develop, acquire and field a new airlift platform. Consequently, the airlift fleet of 2007 will not vary significantly from the airlift fleet of today. The strategic airlifters available to carry the IBCT in 2007 will be the C-5 and C-17. The only significant change will be the completion of the programmed C-17 buy.
Matching up the lift requirements of the IBCT and the lift capabilities of the relevant airlift system is a simple task for a computer simulation. Given a TPFDD, a CONOPS and allocated aircraft, JFAST describes in detail the characteristics of a deployment. JFAST outputs from a simulated deployment to Kosovo clearly demonstrate the challenges of force projection for an early entry force. Can the IBCT deploy from CONUS in 96 hours? Using real world constraints on destination infrastructure and competing demands for airlift, the simple answer is "no, by a factor of nearly two." In fact, to produce a set of parameters that would result in a 96-hour deployment, the IBCT needed over twice the aircraft allocated by USTRANSCOM and a 33 percent increase in aircraft handling capacity at the departure and destination airfields. Failing to account for maintenance and weather attrition that is inevitable during the course of any deployment diminishes even this achievement. The airlift requirement for air mobility support system personnel and equipment further degrades the response time by adding a day to the front of the flow in situations where lack of strategic warning prevents pre-deployment preparation of the air bridge.
The value of the IBCT (and ultimately the Objective Force) as a fighting unit must be decided on its own merits-there is much more at issue than just strategic mobility. Still, the deployment timeline is a critical element of the operational concept. The fact is the IBCT cannot deploy in 96 hours under conditions currently envisioned for 2007. Consequently, the strategic mobility shortfalls of the IBCT must be addressed. The product of further analysis may lead to proposals for increased strategic airlift, decreased IBCT forces structure, reduced vehicle weights or a variety of other remedies to the disconnect identified in this monograph. This battle will likely be fought in the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review with dueling concepts for the future of short-notice force projection battling for their share of the dwindling budget resources.
In the midst of the politics, it is essential that a coherent strategy based on realistic assumptions prevails, regardless of parochial service interests. The security of the nation depends on it.
